Wednesday, October 07, 2026

 

GLOBE TROTTING IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

 

ANSWER PART 1

 

The question of whether the Roman Empire has been erased from the face of the earth is usually answered before it is even asked. Most people carry a ready-made picture: a great empire that flourished, then fell in 476 CE, after which Europe entered a dark interval before the modern West rediscovered its classical inheritance and carried it forward alone. This picture is not neutral. It is a specific historiographical construction, assembled in Western Europe over several centuries for reasons that had as much to do with who was permitted to inherit Rome's authority as with what actually happened to Rome's institutions, populations and administrative machinery. Once the question is examined from outside that construction, a very different answer emerges: not erasure, but a long, contested and still unfinished argument over succession, in which several civilisations, most of them outside the West as it is conventionally imagined, have made and sustained serious claims to be Rome continued rather than Rome mourned.

1. The Manufacture of an Ending

The date 476 CE, the deposition of the boy-emperor Romulus Augustulus in Ravenna by the Germanic general Odoacer, is the conventional marker of Rome's fall in Western textbooks. Yet this event passed with little comment among contemporaries in either half of the empire; it was not experienced, at the time, as the end of anything.[1] It became the fall of Rome only later, retrospectively fixed by chroniclers and, above all, by Enlightenment historiography, most influentially Edward Gibbon, who needed a clean terminal date to organise a moral narrative about the corruption of empire. What this periodisation quietly does is more important than what it states: it defines Rome as a strictly Western and Latin phenomenon, so that its supposed extinction can be followed by a supposedly Western and Latin re-founding, first through the Carolingian and Holy Roman Empires, and later through the Renaissance humanists who cast themselves as the ones who rescued classical civilisation from a thousand years of darkness. The entire architecture depends on Rome having actually died in the West in the fifth century. It did not.

2. The Empire That Never Called Itself Byzantine

For nearly a thousand years after 476, an unbroken Roman state continued to govern from Constantinople, administering Roman law, minting Roman coinage, and commanding populations who called themselves, in their own language, Romaioi Romans. No emperor of this state ever called himself Byzantine; the very word 'Byzantium' is a scholarly retrofit, coined by Western antiquarians centuries later to describe a state that considered itself, without interruption, the Roman Empire. The historian Anthony Kaldellis has argued at length that generations of Byzantinists inherited, largely uncritically, a medieval Western habit of denying Roman identity to the Greek-speaking east a habit that began as political propaganda under Charlemagne's court, which needed to claim that the 'real' Roman Empire had lapsed in the West so that Charlemagne's own coronation in 800 could count as its restoration.[2] On this reading, the label 'Byzantine' is not a description but an act of historiographical erasure in itself: a way of quietly reassigning Rome to the Latin West by renaming its actual continuation in the East as something else, something foreign, something Greek rather than Roman.[3] Reviewers of this thesis do not all accept it in full some argue that Kaldellis understates the genuine complexity of medieval Western attitudes toward the eastern empire but even sceptical reviewers concede that the underlying pattern of denial is real and long-standing.[4] The population that modern textbooks call 'Byzantine' persisted as a self-consciously Roman polity until 1453, and its subjects continued to call themselves Romioi under Ottoman rule long after that.[5]

3. A Turkish and Islamic Rome

When Constantinople finally fell in 1453, its conqueror did not present himself as the destroyer of Rome but as its new master. Mehmed II adopted the title kayser-i Rûm Caesar of Rome within the city he had just taken, retained Constantinople as his capital rather than levelling it, absorbed much of the existing Byzantine administrative and aristocratic class into Ottoman government, and preserved the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the head of the Orthodox millet under his sovereignty.[6] The Greek philosopher George of Trebizond, writing within a generation of the conquest, told Mehmed directly that no one should doubt his standing as Emperor of the Romans an endorsement from within the conquered population itself, not a hostile outside verdict.[7] For more than a century, Ottoman sultans from Mehmed II to Suleiman the Magnificent maintained this Roman imperial self-understanding alongside their Turkic and, after 1517, caliphal titles, using it in particular to justify campaigns against Italy and Western Europe as a reclamation of Roman territory rather than a foreign conquest. If Rome is measured by continuous possession of its own capital city and the administrative apparatus built around it, the strongest claim to Roman succession in 1453 belonged not to any Western European court but to a Turkish-Islamic sultanate.

 

… TO BE CONTINUED …

 

He is STILL Young. He is STILL from the Global South.

Meet AGAIN Mohammad Merajul ISLAM, Researcher

QUESTION: Has the Roman Empire Been Erased from the Earth?

Rethinking Civilizational Transformation Beyond the Western Periodization of Rome

Md. Merajul Islam

Fully Masterized, Department of Social Work, Rajshahi College, Bangladesh

Prof. Dr. Jacques Coulardeau

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France

 

ANSWER PART 2

4. A Slavic and Orthodox Rome

A third claimant arose almost simultaneously, this time from the Orthodox Slavic world. After the fall of Constantinople, the Grand Duchy of Moscow, whose ruler Ivan III had married Sophia Palaiologina, niece of the last Byzantine emperor, began styling itself heir to both Rome and Byzantium. Moscow adopted the Byzantine double-headed eagle, and its rulers took the title tsar, a Slavic rendering of Caesar.[8] This claim was given its most explicit theological form by the monk Filofei of Pskov in a set of letters composed in the 1520s, arguing that the first Rome had fallen through doctrinal heresy, the second Rome, Constantinople, had fallen to the Ottomans as punishment for compromising with that same heresy at the Council of Florence, and that Moscow now stood as the third and final Rome, with no fourth to follow.[9] The doctrine was not official policy at the time of its writing, and it lay largely dormant for three centuries before nineteenth-century Russian historians and Slavophile nationalists revived it as a foundation for imperial and later Pan-Slavic ideology. Whatever one makes of its theological content, it demonstrates that the claim to Roman inheritance was, by the sixteenth century, actively contested among at least three non-identical civilisational successors Ottoman, Muscovite, and Latin-Western none of which regarded Rome as extinguished, only as available for claiming.

5. The Weaker Western Claim, and a Rupture That Came from Elsewhere

Measured against these Eastern claims, the Western European lineage usually presented as Rome's sole heir looks considerably more artificial. Charlemagne's coronation as emperor by Pope Leo III in 800 CE was a legal and theological fiction a Frankish warlord, ruling a kingdom with no continuous administrative descent from the Roman state, crowned by a bishop who himself had no constitutional authority to confer the Roman imperial title. It was translatio imperii by declaration, not by institutional continuity. The Belgian historian Henri Pirenne went further still, arguing in his posthumously published Mohammed and Charlemagne that the Roman economic and cultural world of the Western Mediterranean survived the fifth-century Germanic invasions largely intact, and that the real rupture with antiquity came two centuries later, with the seventh-century Arab conquests of North Africa, Iberia and the eastern and southern Mediterranean, which turned what Pirenne called a Roman lake into what he termed, provocatively, a Muslim one.[10] Pirenne's specific causal chain has been much revised by later archaeological work, which shows Mediterranean trade networks fraying earlier and more unevenly than he allowed, but the core reframing has proven durable: the assumption that Germanic invasion alone ended Roman civilisation in the West is not sustainable, and any honest account of the rupture must include the Islamic world as a central actor, not an outside observer arriving after Rome had already died.[11] This matters for the present argument because it means that even the conventional Western narrative, once examined closely by its own historians, cannot locate a single clean death for Rome. The ending keeps receding the more carefully it is looked for.

 

… TO BE CONTINUED …

Meet Him THIRD TIME MD. MERAJUL

from Rajshahi College, BANGLADESH

QUESTION: Has the Roman Empire Been Erased from the Earth?

Rethinking Civilizational Transformation Beyond the Western Periodization of Rome

Md. Merajul Islam

Fully Masterized, Department of Social Work, Rajshahi College, Bangladesh

Prof. Dr. Jacques Coulardeau

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France

 

ANSWER PART 3

6. Transformation Rather Than Death: A Non-Western Frame

 

The North African historian and jurist Ibn Khaldūn, writing in the fourteenth century from a civilisational tradition entirely outside the Latin Christian world, offers a theoretical model that fits the Roman case far better than the Gibbonian narrative of decline and fall. In the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldūn argued that political power is generated by asabiyyah, group solidarity, which is strongest among peripheral, hardened groups and weakens as a ruling elite settles into the comforts of the state it has built. As that solidarity dissolves, it is not that the state or its civilisation simply vanishes; rather, a new, more cohesive group  often one previously considered peripheral or barbarian by the old centre  absorbs the existing administrative and urban apparatus and re-founds authority upon it, beginning the cycle again.[12] Applied to Rome, this model does not ask whether the empire died in 476, in 1204, or in 1453; it asks which successive groups absorbed the Roman administrative, legal, urban and symbolic apparatus and re-animated it as their own. On that reckoning, the eastern Roman state, the Ottoman sultanate, and Muscovite Russia are not pretenders trading on a dead name they are three of several successful transformations of the same underlying civilisational apparatus, exactly as Ibn Khaldūn's model would predict.[13]

It is worth noting that Western historiography itself has not been fully at peace with the catastrophist story. Peter Brown's influential reframing of the fourth-to-eighth-century Mediterranean world as a period of continuous cultural transformation rather than sudden collapse produced an entire generation of scholarship organised around continuity and adaptation instead of rupture.[14] That reframing has not gone unchallenged from within the Western academy either: historians such as Bryan Ward-Perkins have argued forcefully that the material evidence  collapsing populations, vanishing pottery industries, disappearing literacy shows a real and severe decline in the fifth-century West that softer 'transformation' language risks obscuring.[15] The point, for the present purpose, is not to adjudicate between these two Western camps, but to observe that the debate exists at all. If Western scholarship itself cannot agree whether Rome fell or merely changed shape, then the popular, textbook-level certainty that it was simply erased is doing more ideological work than empirical work.

7. Conclusion: Erasure as an Ideological Convenience

The honest answer to the opening question is that the Roman Empire has not been erased from the earth; it has been distributed, claimed, translated and re-founded by successive civilisations, several of which were not Western at all. Its law shaped Islamic and Byzantine legal codes as much as it shaped European ones. Its capital was ruled continuously, under one Roman-derived title or another, from Constantine's founding of Constantinople in 324 until the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate in 1922 with the interruption of only the Latin crusader occupation of 1204 to 1261. Its symbols were carried into Moscow's state ideology for four centuries. What did happen, repeatedly, is that each successive claimant found it useful to declare the previous claimant finished, so that its own inheritance could appear unrivalled: Charlemagne's court needed the West Roman line to be dead so that his coronation could be a restoration rather than an invention; nineteenth-century European historiography needed the eastern Roman state to be merely 'Byzantine' and Greek rather than Roman, so that classical civilisation's true heirs could be located in Paris, London and Berlin rather than in Constantinople, Istanbul or Moscow.[16] Seen this way, the myth of Rome's total erasure is not a factual finding but a piece of civilisational bookkeeping, drawn up by whichever claimant happened to be writing the textbooks. The more general lesson for the study of civilisational transformation is the same lesson the Roman case teaches in miniature: civilisations rarely die in any clean, datable sense. Their populations disperse or are absorbed, their institutions are stripped for parts, their capitals change hands and their names are quietly redrawn by whoever inherits them next and the resulting continuities are then argued over, for centuries, by each inheritor's historians, precisely because admitting a rival's continuity has always meant conceding a portion of one's own claim to civilisational legitimacy.

 

… TILL NEXT TOPIC …

Bibliography

Brown, Peter. The World of Late Antiquity: AD 150–750. London: Thames & Hudson, 1971.

Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. 6 vols. London: Strahan & Cadell, 1776–1789.

Hodges, Richard, and David Whitehouse. Mohammed, Charlemagne and the Origins of Europe. London: Duckworth, 1983.

Ibn Khaldūn. Al-Muqaddimah (1377). Translated by Franz Rosenthal as The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.

Kaldellis, Anthony. Romanland: Ethnicity and Empire in Byzantium. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019.

Kaldellis, Anthony. The New Roman Empire: A History of Byzantium. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023.

Pirenne, Henri. Mohammed and Charlemagne. Translated by Bernard Miall. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939.

Poe, Marshall. ‘Moscow, the Third Rome: The Origins and Transformations of a “Pivotal Moment.”’ Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 1997.

Ward-Perkins, Bryan. The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Online sources consulted: Wikipedia contributors, 'Ottoman claim to Roman succession'; 'Emperor of the Romans'; 'Mohammed and Charlemagne'; 'Asabiyyah' (all accessed 2026); Encyclopedia.com, 'Third Rome'; EBSCO Research Starters, 'Ivan the Great Organizes the “Third Rome”'; H-Net Reviews and Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies (Cambridge Core) reviews of Romanland; academia.edu, 'The Ottoman Imperial Project of Roman Succession'; ArticHaeology, 'The Last of Roman Emperors'.

 

 

Jacques Coulardeau uploaded a paper

https://jacquescoulardeau.medium.com/launching-pad-rampe-de-lancement-for-research-beginners-0024e7857ed7

https://www.academia.edu/144641680/LAUNCHING_PAD_RAMPE_DE_LANCEMENT_FOR_RESEARCH_BEGINNERS

 

Mohammad Merajul Islam, now he is fully Masterized, will imprint a mark on historical science, both as a researcher and as a Muslim. We have to support the "Renaissance" of Islam in a universe of cosmic hostility.

 

The Roman Transformation: From Empire to Concept

Md. Merajul Islam, Master’s in Social Work, Rajshahi College, Bangladesh

2025, Éditions La Dondaine, Medium.com

The Roman Transformation: From Empire to Concept, 14 Pages

editionsladondaine1981@orange.fr

Roman History,  *  Transformational Leadership,  *  Social History,  *  Charlemagne,  *  Progressive Collapse

 



[1]Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 6 vols. (London: Strahan & Cadell, 1776–1789). The deposition of Romulus Augustulus in 476 CE, which Gibbon uses as his terminal date, was barely remarked upon by contemporary writers in either half of the empire and was recognised as a watershed only retrospectively, by later Latin chroniclers.

[2]Anthony Kaldellis, Romanland: Ethnicity and Empire in Byzantium (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019).

[3]Reviews of Romanland note that Kaldellis treats the labelling of the empire's claim to Roman continuity as a 'deception' by earlier Byzantinists as itself a legacy of medieval Western polemic against the 'Greeks'; see the review in Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies (Cambridge Core, 2021), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/byzantine-and-modern-greek-studies.

[4]H-Net Reviews summarises Kaldellis's central claim that the Greek-speaking, Orthodox, medieval population of the eastern empire maintained an unbroken Roman identity from late antiquity onward, distinct from later scholarly inventions of a 'Byzantine' ethnos; https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=59458.

[5]Anthony Kaldellis, The New Roman Empire: A History of Byzantium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), which frames the eastern empire not as a derivative appendage of the classical world but as a continuously self-renewing Roman state down to 1453.

[6]'Ottoman claim to Roman succession', Wikipedia, summarising the adoption of the title kayser-i Rûm by Mehmed II and his successors, their retention of Constantinople as the imperial seat, the promotion of Byzantine aristocratic families within the Ottoman administration, and the preservation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as evidence of institutional continuity; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_claim_to_Roman_succession.

[7]The endorsement of Mehmed II's claim by the Byzantine-Greek scholar George of Trebizond in 1466 is discussed in 'The Ottoman Imperial Project of Roman Succession', https://www.academia.edu/129635335/The_Ottoman_Imperial_Project_of_Roman_Succession, and in 'The Last of Roman Emperors', ArticHaeology, https://www.artichaeology.com/the-last-of-roman-emperors.

[8]Marshall Poe, 'Moscow, the Third Rome: The Origins and Transformations of a ‘Pivotal Moment’', Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (1997/2001), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/30012196.

[9]'Third Rome', Encyclopedia.com, on the authorship of the doctrine by the monk Filofei of Pskov between 1523 and 1526, and its long dormancy before its revival as state ideology in the nineteenth century; https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/christianity/christianity-general/third-rome. See also 'Ivan the Great Organizes the Third Rome', EBSCO Research Starters, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/ivan-great-organizes-third-rome.

[10]Henri Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, trans. Bernard Miall (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939; first published posthumously 1937).

[11]For the ongoing historiographical debate over Pirenne's thesis and its archaeological revision, see Richard Hodges and David Whitehouse, Mohammed, Charlemagne and the Origins of Europe (London: Duckworth, 1983); and 'Mohammed and Charlemagne', Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_and_Charlemagne.

[12]Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah (1377), trans. Franz Rosenthal as The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958).

[13]On ‘asabiyyah’ as a cyclical, non-teleological model of the rise, consolidation and dissolution of ruling groups, see 'Asabiyyah', Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asabiyyah, summarising Ibn Khaldūn's argument that a civilisation's governing apparatus tends to outlive the group solidarity that first produced it, passing into the hands of a new solidarity rather than disappearing outright.

[14]Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity: AD 150–750 (London: Thames & Hudson, 1971), and the subsequent 'Transformation of the Roman World' research programme it inspired, which reframed the fourth-to-eighth-century Mediterranean as a period of cultural adaptation rather than simple collapse.

[15]For the contrasting 'catastrophist' position, see Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), which argues that material and economic decline in the fifth-century West was real, rapid and measurable, against readings that minimise rupture.

[16]Kaldellis's account of a 'history of denial' running from Carolingian court propaganda through nineteenth-century Hellenist and Orientalist scholarship is summarised in reader responses to Romanland; see https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/40000446-romanland.


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