Wednesday, October 07, 2026
GLOBE TROTTING IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

ANSWER PART 1
The question of
whether the Roman Empire has been erased from the face of the earth is usually
answered before it is even asked. Most people carry a ready-made picture: a
great empire that flourished, then fell in 476 CE, after which Europe entered a
dark interval before the modern West rediscovered its classical inheritance and
carried it forward alone. This picture is not neutral. It is a specific
historiographical construction, assembled in Western Europe over several
centuries for reasons that had as much to do with who was permitted to inherit
Rome's authority as with what actually happened to Rome's institutions,
populations and administrative machinery. Once the question is examined from
outside that construction, a very different answer emerges: not erasure, but a
long, contested and still unfinished argument over succession, in which several
civilisations, most of them outside the West as it is conventionally imagined,
have made and sustained serious claims to be Rome continued rather than Rome
mourned.
1.
The Manufacture of an Ending
The date 476 CE,
the deposition of the boy-emperor Romulus Augustulus in Ravenna by the Germanic
general Odoacer, is the conventional marker of Rome's fall in Western
textbooks. Yet this event passed with little comment among contemporaries in
either half of the empire; it was not experienced, at the time, as the end of
anything.[1] It became the fall of Rome only later,
retrospectively fixed by chroniclers and, above all, by Enlightenment
historiography, most influentially Edward Gibbon, who needed a clean terminal
date to organise a moral narrative about the corruption of empire. What this
periodisation quietly does is more important than what it states: it defines
Rome as a strictly Western and Latin phenomenon, so that its supposed
extinction can be followed by a supposedly Western and Latin re-founding, first
through the Carolingian and Holy Roman Empires, and later through the
Renaissance humanists who cast themselves as the ones who rescued classical
civilisation from a thousand years of darkness. The entire architecture depends
on Rome having actually died in the West in the fifth century. It did
not.

2.
The Empire That Never Called Itself Byzantine
For nearly a
thousand years after 476, an unbroken Roman state continued to govern from
Constantinople, administering Roman law, minting Roman coinage, and commanding
populations who called themselves, in their own language, Romaioi Romans. No
emperor of this state ever called himself Byzantine; the very word 'Byzantium'
is a scholarly retrofit, coined by Western antiquarians centuries later to
describe a state that considered itself, without interruption, the Roman
Empire. The historian Anthony Kaldellis has argued at length that generations
of Byzantinists inherited, largely uncritically, a medieval Western habit of
denying Roman identity to the Greek-speaking east a habit that began as
political propaganda under Charlemagne's court, which needed to claim that the
'real' Roman Empire had lapsed in the West so that Charlemagne's own coronation
in 800 could count as its restoration.[2] On this reading, the label 'Byzantine' is not a
description but an act of historiographical erasure in itself: a way of quietly
reassigning Rome to the Latin West by renaming its actual continuation in the
East as something else, something foreign, something Greek rather than Roman.[3] Reviewers of this thesis do not all accept it in full
some argue that Kaldellis understates the genuine complexity of medieval
Western attitudes toward the eastern empire but even sceptical reviewers
concede that the underlying pattern of denial is real and long-standing.[4] The population that modern textbooks call 'Byzantine'
persisted as a self-consciously Roman polity until 1453, and its subjects
continued to call themselves Romioi under Ottoman rule long after that.[5]
3.
A Turkish and Islamic Rome
When
Constantinople finally fell in 1453, its conqueror did not present himself as
the destroyer of Rome but as its new master. Mehmed II adopted the title
kayser-i Rûm Caesar of Rome within the city he had just taken, retained
Constantinople as his capital rather than levelling it, absorbed much of the
existing Byzantine administrative and aristocratic class into Ottoman
government, and preserved the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the head of the
Orthodox millet under his sovereignty.[6] The Greek philosopher George of Trebizond, writing
within a generation of the conquest, told Mehmed directly that no one should
doubt his standing as Emperor of the Romans an endorsement from within the
conquered population itself, not a hostile outside verdict.[7] For more than a century, Ottoman sultans from Mehmed
II to Suleiman the Magnificent maintained this Roman imperial
self-understanding alongside their Turkic and, after 1517, caliphal titles,
using it in particular to justify campaigns against Italy and Western Europe as
a reclamation of Roman territory rather than a foreign conquest. If Rome is
measured by continuous possession of its own capital city and the
administrative apparatus built around it, the strongest claim to Roman
succession in 1453 belonged not to any Western European court but to a
Turkish-Islamic sultanate.
… TO
BE CONTINUED …
He
is STILL Young. He is STILL from the Global South.
Meet AGAIN
Mohammad Merajul ISLAM, Researcher
QUESTION:
Has the Roman Empire Been Erased from the Earth?
Rethinking Civilizational Transformation Beyond the
Western Periodization of Rome
Md.
Merajul Islam
Fully Masterized, Department of Social Work, Rajshahi
College, Bangladesh
Prof. Dr. Jacques Coulardeau
Université
Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France
ANSWER PART 2
4.
A Slavic and Orthodox Rome
A third claimant
arose almost simultaneously, this time from the Orthodox Slavic world. After
the fall of Constantinople, the Grand Duchy of Moscow, whose ruler Ivan III had
married Sophia Palaiologina, niece of the last Byzantine emperor, began styling
itself heir to both Rome and Byzantium. Moscow adopted the Byzantine
double-headed eagle, and its rulers took the title tsar, a Slavic rendering of
Caesar.[8] This claim was given its most explicit theological
form by the monk Filofei of Pskov in a set of letters composed in the 1520s,
arguing that the first Rome had fallen through doctrinal heresy, the second
Rome, Constantinople, had fallen to the Ottomans as punishment for compromising
with that same heresy at the Council of Florence, and that Moscow now stood as
the third and final Rome, with no fourth to follow.[9] The doctrine was not official policy at the time of
its writing, and it lay largely dormant for three centuries before
nineteenth-century Russian historians and Slavophile nationalists revived it as
a foundation for imperial and later Pan-Slavic ideology. Whatever one makes of
its theological content, it demonstrates that the claim to Roman inheritance
was, by the sixteenth century, actively contested among at least three
non-identical civilisational successors Ottoman, Muscovite, and Latin-Western
none of which regarded Rome as extinguished, only as available for claiming.
5.
The Weaker Western Claim, and a Rupture That Came from Elsewhere
Measured against
these Eastern claims, the Western European lineage usually presented as Rome's
sole heir looks considerably more artificial. Charlemagne's coronation as
emperor by Pope Leo III in 800 CE was a legal and theological fiction a
Frankish warlord, ruling a kingdom with no continuous administrative descent
from the Roman state, crowned by a bishop who himself had no constitutional
authority to confer the Roman imperial title. It was translatio imperii by
declaration, not by institutional continuity. The Belgian historian Henri
Pirenne went further still, arguing in his posthumously published Mohammed and
Charlemagne that the Roman economic and cultural world of the Western
Mediterranean survived the fifth-century Germanic invasions largely intact, and
that the real rupture with antiquity came two centuries later, with the
seventh-century Arab conquests of North Africa, Iberia and the eastern and
southern Mediterranean, which turned what Pirenne called a Roman lake into what
he termed, provocatively, a Muslim one.[10] Pirenne's specific causal chain has been much revised
by later archaeological work, which shows Mediterranean trade networks fraying
earlier and more unevenly than he allowed, but the core reframing has proven
durable: the assumption that Germanic invasion alone ended Roman civilisation
in the West is not sustainable, and any honest account of the rupture must
include the Islamic world as a central actor, not an outside observer arriving
after Rome had already died.[11] This matters for the present argument because it
means that even the conventional Western narrative, once examined closely by
its own historians, cannot locate a single clean death for Rome. The ending
keeps receding the more carefully it is looked for.

… TO BE CONTINUED …
Meet Him THIRD TIME MD. MERAJUL
from Rajshahi College, BANGLADESH
QUESTION:
Has the Roman Empire Been Erased from the Earth?
Rethinking Civilizational Transformation Beyond the
Western Periodization of Rome
Md.
Merajul Islam
Fully Masterized, Department of Social Work, Rajshahi
College, Bangladesh
Prof. Dr. Jacques Coulardeau
Université
Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France
ANSWER PART 3
6.
Transformation Rather Than Death: A Non-Western Frame

The North African
historian and jurist Ibn Khaldūn, writing in the fourteenth century from a civilisational
tradition entirely outside the Latin Christian world, offers a theoretical
model that fits the Roman case far better than the Gibbonian narrative of
decline and fall. In the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldūn argued that political power is
generated by asabiyyah, group solidarity, which is strongest among peripheral,
hardened groups and weakens as a ruling elite settles into the comforts of the
state it has built. As that solidarity dissolves, it is not that the state or
its civilisation simply vanishes; rather, a new, more cohesive group often one previously considered peripheral or
barbarian by the old centre absorbs the
existing administrative and urban apparatus and re-founds authority upon it,
beginning the cycle again.[12] Applied to Rome, this model does not ask whether the
empire died in 476, in 1204, or in 1453; it asks which successive groups
absorbed the Roman administrative, legal, urban and symbolic apparatus and
re-animated it as their own. On that reckoning, the eastern Roman state, the
Ottoman sultanate, and Muscovite Russia are not pretenders trading on a dead
name they are three of several successful transformations of the same
underlying civilisational apparatus, exactly as Ibn Khaldūn's model would
predict.[13]
It is worth noting
that Western historiography itself has not been fully at peace with the
catastrophist story. Peter Brown's influential reframing of the
fourth-to-eighth-century Mediterranean world as a period of continuous cultural
transformation rather than sudden collapse produced an entire generation of
scholarship organised around continuity and adaptation instead of rupture.[14] That reframing has not gone unchallenged from within
the Western academy either: historians such as Bryan Ward-Perkins have argued
forcefully that the material evidence
collapsing populations, vanishing pottery industries, disappearing
literacy shows a real and severe decline in the fifth-century West that softer
'transformation' language risks obscuring.[15] The point, for the present purpose, is not to
adjudicate between these two Western camps, but to observe that the debate
exists at all. If Western scholarship itself cannot agree whether Rome fell or
merely changed shape, then the popular, textbook-level certainty that it was
simply erased is doing more ideological work than empirical work.

7.
Conclusion: Erasure as an Ideological
Convenience
The honest answer
to the opening question is that the Roman Empire has not been erased from the
earth; it has been distributed, claimed, translated and re-founded by
successive civilisations, several of which were not Western at all. Its law
shaped Islamic and Byzantine legal codes as much as it shaped European ones.
Its capital was ruled continuously, under one Roman-derived title or another,
from Constantine's founding of Constantinople in 324 until the abolition of the
Ottoman sultanate in 1922 with the interruption of only the Latin crusader
occupation of 1204 to 1261. Its symbols were carried into Moscow's state
ideology for four centuries. What did happen, repeatedly, is that each
successive claimant found it useful to declare the previous claimant finished,
so that its own inheritance could appear unrivalled: Charlemagne's court needed
the West Roman line to be dead so that his coronation could be a restoration
rather than an invention; nineteenth-century European historiography needed the
eastern Roman state to be merely 'Byzantine' and Greek rather than Roman, so
that classical civilisation's true heirs could be located in Paris, London and
Berlin rather than in Constantinople, Istanbul or Moscow.[16] Seen this way, the myth of Rome's total erasure is
not a factual finding but a piece of civilisational bookkeeping, drawn up by
whichever claimant happened to be writing the textbooks. The more general
lesson for the study of civilisational transformation is the same lesson the
Roman case teaches in miniature: civilisations rarely die in any clean, datable
sense. Their populations disperse or are absorbed, their institutions are
stripped for parts, their capitals change hands and their names are quietly
redrawn by whoever inherits them next and the resulting continuities are then
argued over, for centuries, by each inheritor's historians, precisely because
admitting a rival's continuity has always meant conceding a portion of one's
own claim to civilisational legitimacy.
… TILL NEXT TOPIC …
Bibliography
Brown, Peter. The
World of Late Antiquity: AD 150–750. London: Thames & Hudson, 1971.
Gibbon, Edward.
The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. 6 vols. London:
Strahan & Cadell, 1776–1789.
Hodges, Richard,
and David Whitehouse. Mohammed, Charlemagne and the Origins of Europe. London:
Duckworth, 1983.
Ibn Khaldūn.
Al-Muqaddimah (1377). Translated by Franz Rosenthal as The Muqaddimah: An
Introduction to History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.
Kaldellis,
Anthony. Romanland: Ethnicity and Empire in Byzantium. Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019.
Kaldellis,
Anthony. The New Roman Empire: A History of Byzantium. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2023.
Pirenne, Henri.
Mohammed and Charlemagne. Translated by Bernard Miall. London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1939.
Poe, Marshall.
‘Moscow, the Third Rome: The Origins and Transformations of a “Pivotal
Moment.”’ Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 1997.
Ward-Perkins,
Bryan. The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005.
Online sources
consulted: Wikipedia contributors, 'Ottoman claim to Roman succession';
'Emperor of the Romans'; 'Mohammed and Charlemagne'; 'Asabiyyah' (all accessed
2026); Encyclopedia.com, 'Third Rome'; EBSCO Research Starters, 'Ivan the Great
Organizes the “Third Rome”'; H-Net Reviews and Byzantine and Modern Greek
Studies (Cambridge Core) reviews of Romanland; academia.edu, 'The Ottoman
Imperial Project of Roman Succession'; ArticHaeology, 'The Last of Roman
Emperors'.

Jacques
Coulardeau uploaded a paper
https://www.academia.edu/144641680/LAUNCHING_PAD_RAMPE_DE_LANCEMENT_FOR_RESEARCH_BEGINNERS
Mohammad
Merajul Islam, now he is fully Masterized, will imprint a mark on historical science, both as a
researcher and as a Muslim. We have to support the "Renaissance" of
Islam in a universe of cosmic hostility.

The Roman
Transformation: From Empire to Concept
Md. Merajul Islam,
Master’s in Social Work, Rajshahi College, Bangladesh
2025, Éditions La Dondaine, Medium.com
The Roman Transformation: From Empire to Concept, 14 Pages
editionsladondaine1981@orange.fr
Roman History, * Transformational
Leadership, * Social History, * Charlemagne, * Progressive
Collapse


[1]Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
6 vols. (London: Strahan & Cadell, 1776–1789). The deposition of Romulus
Augustulus in 476 CE, which Gibbon uses as his terminal date, was barely
remarked upon by contemporary writers in either half of the empire and was
recognised as a watershed only retrospectively, by later Latin chroniclers.
[2]Anthony Kaldellis, Romanland: Ethnicity and Empire in Byzantium
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019).
[3]Reviews of Romanland note that Kaldellis treats the labelling of the
empire's claim to Roman continuity as a 'deception' by earlier Byzantinists as
itself a legacy of medieval Western polemic against the 'Greeks'; see the
review in Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies (Cambridge Core, 2021),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/byzantine-and-modern-greek-studies.
[4]H-Net Reviews summarises Kaldellis's central claim that the
Greek-speaking, Orthodox, medieval population of the eastern empire maintained
an unbroken Roman identity from late antiquity onward, distinct from later
scholarly inventions of a 'Byzantine' ethnos; https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=59458.
[5]Anthony Kaldellis, The New Roman Empire: A History of Byzantium (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2023), which frames the eastern empire not as a
derivative appendage of the classical world but as a continuously self-renewing
Roman state down to 1453.
[6]'Ottoman claim to Roman succession', Wikipedia, summarising the adoption
of the title kayser-i Rûm by Mehmed II and his successors, their retention of
Constantinople as the imperial seat, the promotion of Byzantine aristocratic
families within the Ottoman administration, and the preservation of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate as evidence of institutional continuity;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_claim_to_Roman_succession.
[7]The endorsement of Mehmed II's claim by the Byzantine-Greek scholar
George of Trebizond in 1466 is discussed in 'The Ottoman Imperial Project of
Roman Succession',
https://www.academia.edu/129635335/The_Ottoman_Imperial_Project_of_Roman_Succession,
and in 'The Last of Roman Emperors', ArticHaeology,
https://www.artichaeology.com/the-last-of-roman-emperors.
[8]Marshall Poe, 'Moscow, the Third Rome: The Origins and Transformations
of a ‘Pivotal Moment’', Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (1997/2001),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/30012196.
[9]'Third Rome', Encyclopedia.com, on the authorship of the doctrine by the
monk Filofei of Pskov between 1523 and 1526, and its long dormancy before its
revival as state ideology in the nineteenth century;
https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/christianity/christianity-general/third-rome.
See also 'Ivan the Great Organizes the Third Rome', EBSCO Research Starters,
https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/ivan-great-organizes-third-rome.
[10]Henri Pirenne, Mohammed
and Charlemagne, trans. Bernard Miall (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1939; first published posthumously 1937).
[11]For the ongoing historiographical debate over Pirenne's thesis and its
archaeological revision, see Richard Hodges and David Whitehouse, Mohammed,
Charlemagne and the Origins of Europe (London: Duckworth, 1983); and 'Mohammed
and Charlemagne', Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_and_Charlemagne.
[12]Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddimah (1377), trans. Franz
Rosenthal as The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1958).
[13]On ‘asabiyyah’ as a cyclical, non-teleological model of the rise,
consolidation and dissolution of ruling groups, see 'Asabiyyah', Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asabiyyah, summarising Ibn Khaldūn's argument
that a civilisation's governing apparatus tends to outlive the group solidarity
that first produced it, passing into the hands of a new solidarity rather than
disappearing outright.
[14]Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity: AD 150–750 (London: Thames
& Hudson, 1971), and the subsequent 'Transformation of the Roman World'
research programme it inspired, which reframed the fourth-to-eighth-century
Mediterranean as a period of cultural adaptation rather than simple collapse.
[15]For the contrasting 'catastrophist' position, see Bryan Ward-Perkins,
The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), which argues that material and economic decline in the fifth-century
West was real, rapid and measurable, against readings that minimise rupture.
[16]Kaldellis's account of a 'history of denial' running from Carolingian
court propaganda through nineteenth-century Hellenist and Orientalist
scholarship is summarised in reader responses to Romanland; see
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/40000446-romanland.
