JARON LANIER – YOU ARE NOT A GADGET – 2010-2011
This book is small by its size
but it is enormous by the subject it discusses. He starts in an extremely
positive way by saying: “Technologies are extensions of ourselves.”
(p. 4) We could then believe he was going to follow Marshall McLuhan in his
tracks since the latter was the inventor of this idea in many books covering a
full history of human technology and how each step of it was a new extension of
one new sense or one new physiological, sensorial or mental ability of man. We
could have expected Jaron Lanier was going to show how the “cloud” or “web 2.0” were extensions of
ourselves, of our central nervous system for example, of our brain maybe, or
our mind.
But Jaron Lanier does not even
refer to Marshall McLuhan. And he does not follow that track.
He targets two types of
Technologists he identifies as “cybernetic totalists” and “digital
Maoists.” This community is qualified by what they advocate or
represent. First of all they are the open culture community, those people who
consider everything has to be on the Internet and everything on the Internet
has to be free of access, economically free hence everyone can get it for
nothing, and what’s more everyone can do what they want with what they find and
appropriate freely. Jaron Lanier calls that mashups. These people believe in
Creative Commons, a license that is no license at all, a license that authorizes
anyone who wants to use something for a non commercial production to do it
without in anyway contacting the initial proprietor and without leaving any
tracks behind. The appropriated “goods” are thus used in all possible ways
without anyone knowing really who is responsible for the final product or
products thus produced, the afore-mentioned mashups. Their mascot software is
Linux which is nothing but the old command-line software known as UNIX wrapped up
in a Graphical User’s Interface to make it user-friendly. They are the people
of the Artificial Intelligence lobby that pretends that they can, or will soon
be able to, simulate human intelligence and the machine they will use to
simulate that intelligence will be intelligent, just as if a plane, since it
can fly, were a bird. They are the full proponents of web 2.0, this version of
the web that enables the circulation of all kinds of products, freely and
easily, with the development on top of it of social networks. And finally they
are characterized by the fact that they want to share and mashup files that
have no context, meaning they cannot be attached to anyone or anything that
could claim some propriety right on the file. They are called anti-context
file sharers and remashers.
Jaron Lanier takes a strong
stance against these people but not in the name of the technology they propose
or advocate, but in the name of the deep consequences of these technologies.
The whole book is dedicated to that exploration. But he defines his objective
as soon as page 19 when he explains the five reasons why all this is important,
all that amounting to “people defining themselves downward.”
1-
“Emphasizing the crowd means deemphasizing the
individual in the design of society, and when you ask people not to be people,
they revert to bad moblike behaviors. This leads to not only empowered trolls
but to a generally unfriendly and unconstructive online world.”
2-
“Finance was transformed by computing clouds.
Success in finance became increasingly about manipulating the cloud at the
expense of sound financial principles.”
3-
“There are proposals to transform the conduct if
science along similar lines. Scientists would then understand less of what they
do.”
4-
“Pop culture has entered into a nostalgic
malaise. Online culture is dominated by trivial mashups of the culture that
existed before the onset of mashups, and by fandom responding to the dwindling
outposts of centralized mass media. It is a culture of reaction without
action.”
5-
“Spirituality is committing suicide.
Consciousness is attempting to will itself out of existence.”
The diagnosis is severe and the
book is trying to suggest solutions.
His first question then is about
how this cloud or web 2.0 technology is changing people. It develops in them a
crowd mentality, what he calls a “hive mind” or “noosphere.” The reference to
“noosphere” is never exploited, but the term “hive mind” is vastly exploited
and developed into “hive mind thinking,” “hive thinking” and other expressions
of this type. It is a metaphor and he may not be responsible for it since it is
an old metaphor. But using it for the mentality of the people blindly using web
2.0 and cloud technology is warping the metaphor out of any meaning but
excludes the only proper meaning of a herd stampeding wildly across the virtual
sky of the Cloud. A hive is a social organization with a very clear and rather
rigid hierarchy, with each member having to do one task everyday, each category
of members having one special task to perform, including the queen who has to
feed in order to lay eggs. The hive produces several products that are highly
sophisticated all transformed from collected pollens: honey, wax, royal jelly,
propolis, and many others. They take care of the hive and keep it in perfect
shape: any mishap endangers the whole colony or swarm. There is nothing of the
sort in the cloud, on the Internet on web 2.0. What’s more bees have a language
that enables one to tell the others where she has found a good field of
flowers. This language is a highly symbolic sign and dance language based on
extremely objective elements like the sun, angular orientation to the sun,
distances, etc. No one has studied what happens to a bee who could not
accurately give that kind of information, or who would endanger the hive and
the swarm by reckless actions. That kind of social organization of the survival
project of a beehive requires some kind of regulatory authority to take care of
trespassers. Hackers are not welcome.
This metaphor is bad and it would
have been well advised to use another one like herd psychology or crowd
psychology. In fact he could have even been ironical with an expression like
Panurge’s sheep borrowed from Rabelais’s Pantagruel,
himself borrowing it from antiquity, Panurge meaning in Greek “he who can do
everything”.
Beyond that Jaron Lanier insists
on the reductionism of this cloud ideology. It forces to anonymity and pseudonymity,
both practices that reduce simple personal humanity. He points out how this
ideology, this technology produces a complete contradiction that they assume:
“It’s the people who make the forum, not the software. Without the software the
experience would not exist at all.” (p. 72) The forum is then illusionary. He
says the software is “flawed.” The point is that everyone knows it is flawed in
its very principle of requiring in the form of an encouragement and an
incitation to use personae and avatars instead of real identity and pictures,
and then everyone makes do with this software, with this technology. And yet
Jaron Lanier is not entirely clear since he advises not to concentrate on the
software because then you forget the person behind or the person in the user of
the software. If the software is bad, it has to be gotten rid of. But we have
to wonder if this anonymity and pseudonymity is not in a way a positive
element. Not for security of course, since the IP of a computer can be traced
within seconds by any let’s say “security authority” not to speak of hackers
and spywares. Some people complain that the Internet enables anyone to say
anything without any control. Then what’s the problem? The Internet does not
aim at only telling the truth, and what is the truth? Something decided by
Parliament or Congress or the United Nations? Some people consider we are not
dealing with real people since they are hiding behind avatars. And then what!
Deal with the ideas expressed by these avatars, if they express ideas,
otherwise forget them. Jaron Lanier seems to believe that this crowd psychology
was invented by the Internet and web 2.0. That is certainly not true. We all
know “bread and circuses” events in all societies in all historical periods
including some war episodes to satisfy public opinion and popular demand. Some
of these mass events could be very grim like hanging and drawing and quartering
people in England, frying
homosexuals in oil in France,
impaling people in other countries, and still beheading people with swords like
in Saudi Arabia
still.
He is right when he says
Cybernetic totalism has failed spiritually by fetishizing objects and objectizing
people; behaviorally
by undervaluing individuals and overvaluing the crowd; and economically by endangering
the economy of all types of expression (music, videos, photography, text, etc)
and by permitting highly risky financial schemes that could not be devised
before. This cloud reduces the creativity of individuals by erasing any
circumstantial, existential, experiential real data from Internet products.
Real creativity can only come from a circumstantial, existential, experiential
real environment of one real individual who invests all that environment in his
creativity and in his creation. If the Internet and web 2.0 succeed in that
line, how long can the world live without creativity? Yet I will express some
reserve on this extreme vision. Real creative people are produced by their
circumstantial, existential, experiential context. The Internet and the Cloud
can be part of this context but cannot erase it. Mozart would always have been
Mozart even if he hadn’t died in poverty: he would still have been composing on
his death bed, I guess. The new point is that all those whose creativity is
very limited can today “create” and broadcast their “creations” thus producing
a tremendous inflation on the cultural or musical market. But even if that may
harm many professional creators of value, these have to find ways to protect
their work and to guarantee their survival. That’s called union action. I
believe that the proportion of creative artists is not going to go down because
of this technology. Plays in theaters, concerts in concert halls, films in
cinemas, but also the DVDs of these live shows are multiplying their audiences,
direct live audience as well as indirect audience at a distance in space and
time. A full reform of the management of the Internet is to be thought through
and brought about but there is no reason to believe creativity is going to be
drowned by the mediocre flock bleating of the herded crowd of the newly
Internet-empowered people.
Jaron Lanier is conscious of this
dimension and he proposes a humanistic approach of this Cloud technology. The
main suggestion is to make all products freely reachable on the Internet but
the user would not pay a flat rate but a rate in proportion with the quantity
of bits that user would have reached no matter what, including the pictures of
his/her sweetheart/boyfriend. On the other hand that user would get a payment
for all the bits of his/hers that have been reached by other people, including
from his/her sweetheart/boyfriend. This suggestion should be taken seriously
because then the circulation of bits on the Internet would become a market and
that would bring quality at the top. Though we must not forget that before the
Internet and that will be eternal all that reaches the broadcasting public
sphere is not necessarily good and all that is good does not necessarily reach
the broadcasting public sphere. Thousands of good books have never been
published and thousands of good Mozarts have never been able to perform or
become publicly known. Jaron Lanier’s approach though requires some reflection
on how a creative work is produced, by whom, at what and which and whose cost,
how that creative production can be encouraged? Subsidize it, encourage the
profitable broadcasting of it, create events where creators can confront
themselves with others and with an audience;, including critics, and many other
solutions have to be found. Personally I am quite more afraid of the weight of
norms, standards and traditions in professional fields than of the competition
from the herd’s mooing and dooking.
He insists on another effect of
computational technology on any knowledge or let’s say semantic data. It grinds
it down into small items in order to digitalize them. It standardizes the basic
units: computationalized music notes do not contain any fuzzy variation; they
are pure but no instrument played by any musician will ever produce pure notes.
Considering the meaning of anything comes from the variations this anything
contains, a dog being seen differently by any single person thinking of a dog,
this systematic purification and simplification of every item processed digitally
produces an enormous loss of meaning. Imagine the 25 or so ways Eskimos have to
speak of the snow and Egyptians or Arabs have to speak of the sand or the sun.
This grinding of everything down into some bit-powder destroys the architecture
of the original object and its inner hierarchy: it aims at simulating a
phenomenon or an object but a beautiful picture of a rose does not smell like a
rose: it does not prick either. What’s more all the particular environment
attached to that item by the person who carries it is erased and lost.
That’s when Jaron Lanier tries to
cope with language and bring it back into his conception of computationalism.
He is no linguist and he refers to people who are no linguists. To come to his
own version he has to reject other approaches. First of all Ray Kurzweil’s
Singularity as becoming a newly invented secular religion:
“Those who ,enter into the
theater of computationalism are given all the mental solace that is usually
associated with traditional religions. These include consolations for
metaphysical yearnings, in the form of the race to climb to ever more “meta” or
higher-level states of digital representations, and even a colorful
eschatology, in the form of the Singularity. And indeed, through the
Singularity a hope of an afterlife is available to the most fervent believers.”
(p. 178)
He rejects in the same way the
approach that considers the inner thing is the same thing as the outer thing
that supports that a computer with specialized features is similar to a person,
hence is a person. He rejects of course the Turing approach since it is
basically a very similar attempt: a machine that cannot be differentiated from
a human person in its and his/her reactions is as intelligent as that human
person, hence is a human person.
It’s when he suggests a realistic
approach of computationalim that he gets lost into language.
He starts with Jim Bower and
tries to compare olfaction with language. He asserts that both work “from
entries in a catalog not from infinitely morphable patterns” (p. 165). He
contradicts this assertion for language page 167: “Only a handful of species,
including humans and certain birds, can make a huge and ever-changing variety
of sounds.” Of Course he speaks of sounds and before he spoke of words. That’s
just the point. The words have been phylogenetically produced from sounds. He
misses the articulations of language. He contradicts his first assertion again
page 190: “We can make a wide variety of weird noises through our mouths,
spontaneously and as fast as we think. That’s why we are able to use language.”
He does not wonder why we can do that: what physiological particularity enables
us to do it?
He continues his parallel with
olfaction and says: “the grammar of language is primarily a way of fitting
those dictionary words into a larger context. Perhaps the grammar of language
is rooted in the grammar of smells.” (p. 165) This is a non-cautious assertion
about linguistic syntax. It negates the various articulations that build the
hierarchy of language. Language can’t really be compared with smells. Once again
the grammar of language is an invention of man and has been produced from
scratch by a long and complex phylogenic process from simple isolated sounds to
complex discourses.
To crown it all he compares the
Tourette syndrome in which a man or woman uncontrollably produces all kinds of
swear words to the “pheronomic system [that] detects very specific strong odors
given off by other animals (usually of the same species) typically related to
fear and mating.” (p. 165) First consider the fact that all mammals produce the
same hormone for fear, which explains that in the wild a man’s fear can be
detected by other mammals which will get on the offensive because an animal who
is afraid attacks, and since the man here is detected as being afraid hence as
going to attack, the best defense is to attack, so the wild animal will attack.
Anyone who has some practice of some jungle knows that. Never be afraid in such
a situation if you want to have one chance to survive. Then I can’t see how he
can compare these pheromonic smells, their detection and the reactions a mammal
may have to them to swear words. A Tourette patient cannot use swear words
he/she has not heard first, learned second, memorized third. Swear words are
not instinctive.
At that point we have to say
Jaron Lanier is completely off the point concerning language. He does not take
into account the phylogeny of language experienced by Homo Sapiens in concrete
conditions; he does not consider the psychogenesis of language experienced by a
child learning it in concrete conditions. He does not know about the
hierarchical articulations of language and the immense variations from one
family of languages to the next, and within each family of languages. Finally
he does not know about the distinction between “langue” which represents the
infinite expressive potential carried by language and “discourse” which is the
concrete realization of one expression of one meaning in real conditions.
And yet he is brandishing the
essential concept to approach these problems: neoteny, the fact that human
children are born extremely immature, premature, dependent for a long period of
several years. That would have given to all his other arguments a power they do
not have. Yet he concludes properly not as the final conclusion of the whole
book but as the conclusive deduction of the final concept of neoteny brought up
at the end of the book.
Moore’s law (the exponential
development rate of hardware) will have to accept to be slowed down or even
blocked by the very slow development rate of software, the fact that neoteny
has a conservative effect since the younger generation are forced into an ever
longer period of training that reproduces and ossifies previous knowledge and
know-how. Cultural neoteny is even more drastic since it leads to Bachelard’s Poetics of Reverie, vastly overused here
since Bachelard is from a period when these modern techniques did not exist,
when life expectancy was very limited and when education was only for an elite
but the general idea is correct: “The good includes a numinous imagination,
unbounded hope, innocence and sweetness.” (p. 183) But on the other side
childhood can also produce what Jaron Lanier identifies as William Golding’s Lord of the Flies: “The bad is more
obvious, and includes bullying, voracious irritability, and selfishness.” (p.
183) His conclusion is realistic for once: “The net provides copious examples
of both aspects of neoteny.” (p. 183) This constant dichotomy, and in fact we
should see more than two sides, on the Internet is the possibility for the
Internet to be the place were various approaches will be confronted,
confronting one another, hence will be a marketplace of some sort, the
marketplace of global communication.
If he is right about childhood
and youth, we better start thinking of education and start integrating the
internet and the Cloud in our systematic education efforts not to moralize, not
to demonize, not to advocate the Internet but to teach children how to use it
to their own advantage along their own motivations, not the teachers’. He sure
is right when he says: “Our secret weapon is childhood.” (p. 188)
Why the heck did he not start from there and consider the phylogeny of Homo
Sapiens and the psychogenesis of all children.
I will overlook his “Post
Symbolic communication.” Homo Sapiens started on his/her track to
humanity by developing his symbolic power and among other things by using it to
invent language from his multiple sounds through a simple process of
discriminating items, identifying them including with names and classifying
them into concepts and conceptual classes. Homo Sapiens could only recognize
one item when he had already encountered it, discriminated it, identified it
and classified it, otherwise Homo Sapiens had to start all over again for the
item he did not know.
If by any chance Homo Sapiens
moved beyond that symbolic power and lost it he/she would lose everything,
including all his/her knowledge that was constructed with language. If Jaron
Lanier wants to mean that man is going to reach a higher level of symbolic
power, I would entirely agree. The machines developed today by the scientific
and technical elite of the world are going to be used by everyone as soon as
they are born, and even before their birth, which will increase their
intelligence tremendously. The increased intelligence of the global population
will also mean an increased intelligence of the elite of the world. The elite
only reflects the level of their surrounding masses.
But Jaron Lanier forgets that
Homo Sapiens is still an animal species going through mutations. The point is that
there is no natural selection among humans any more. All those who are
different are treated as handicapped or dangerous and they are kept aside or
away. It is high time we start changing our vision and consider the potential
of those who are different. Autistic children with the Asperger syndrome for
example seem to have great possibilities, among other things in languages.
Daniel Tammet is one example of a successful Asperger Savant in foreign
languages. It is urgent to consider that Childhood is our secret weapon and to
really make an effort to screen these new different people and help them find
out their real capabilities and develop them to the best level possible. Right
now we might be rejecting the people who represent the future of our species,
not the destroyers of it, those who will bring our intellect and intelligence
to a higher ever point and will event even better machines to serve humanity.
Dr Jacques COULARDEAU
# posted by Dr. Jacques COULARDEAU @ 9:05 AM